Your humble blogger has found M. K. Bhadrakumar to be a bit of a mixed bag as a geopolitical commentator. On the one hand, he’s written many extremely insightful columns at his website, Indian Punchline. But from time to time, he’s had some pieces that were eyebrow-raising, such as ones where he speculated on Russian politics. However, below he is discussing India’s view of BRICS, and here he should be on very solid ground. And as you will soon see, in a fresh interview with Glenn Diesen, Bhadrakumar gives a harsh reading of the BRICS project.
The fundamentals of India’s position are very much like the foreign policy principles that Jerri-Lynn Scofield described, citing the statements of India’s impressive Minister for External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Jerri cited key passages from S. Jaishankar’s 2020 book, TThe India Way” rel=”nofollow”>he India Way: Primer for India’s Multipolar Approach to Foreign Policy in a 2022 post:
Jaishankar outlined a foreign policy for India to pursue in a multipolar world:
…it is the underlying assumptions that can make a difference. We have been conditioned to think of the post-1945 world as the norm and departures from it as deviations. In fact, our own pluralistic and complex history underlines that the natural state of the world is multipolarity. It also brings out the constraints in the application of power. A behaviour and a thought process which reflects that can facilitate the creation of a more favourable equilibrium with others (Jaishankar, p. 20).
As I noted in March when I last addressed these issues in IIndia Is Mulling Rupee-Ruble Payments System for Trade with Russia, this multipolar orientation draws from the non-alignment tradition that India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, pioneered in the immediate post-colonial period. But as Chowdhury told me, “The new policy is one of multi-alignment, where India engages with all major countries – but kowtows to no one.” Note that this is a world no longer dominated by the G8; instead, half the world’s twenty largest economies are now non-Western (Jaishankar, p. 41).
According to Jaishankar:
Geopolitics and balance of power are the underpinning of international relations. India has a tradition of Kautilyan politics that puts a premium on them. If there are lessons from the near part, it is that these were not given the weightage that they deserved. The Bandung era of Afro-Asia n solidarity in the 1950s serves as a reminder of the costs of neglecting hard power. But more than lack of focus on capabilities, they reflect an underlying thinking. We have since reached a league where the ability to protect our interests is an assumption, not just an option. This is best done through a mix of national strengths and external relationships (Jaishankar, p. 16).
In 2024, we posted Indian Foreign Minister Throws Cold Water on the Idea of a BRICS Currency. Keep in mind, as we have repeatedly stressed, that the BRICS initiative of setting up payment systems to facilitate bi-lateral trade, frees countries in participating trade pairs from dollar sanctions and is thus very beneficial. But it does not amount to the goal that many BRICS enthusiasts attributed to the alliance, that of creating a new currency. From that post:
The remarks by the highly respected Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar should put paid to the idea that a BRICS currency is coming soon, if ever. Jaishankar raises a series of particular issues consistent with a point we have made: that a common currency would require a very substantial legal and systems architecture. Agreeing on the legal structure would entail a reduction of sovereignity (BRICS rulings would have to supercede national courts) which seems contrary to the notion that BRICS is meant to increase, rather than reduce, national sovereignity. Jaishankar also points out, as we have, that the BRICS nations are too economically diverse (as in often divergent) to make a common scheme work easily if at all.
Jaishankar points out that bi-lateral currency deals work well enough and appear satisfactory to most BRICS members. That does leave unsolved the point that your humble blogger and Michael Hudson have raise: that absent mechanisms to encourage balanced trade such as the ones that were part of Keynes’ Bancor, many countries are likely to wind up with sustained trade deficits relative to particular trade partners. What happens when those countries wind up with a lot more of that currency than they want? They can use it to buy assets in the chronic trade deficit country, but a lot of nations do or would place restrictions.
With that as prologue, Bhadrakumar’s remarks should come as less of a surprise. Starting at 22:15: